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a suit so far as they are not negatived by the plain terms of
85
the grant.1
I take this to mean that it is not necessary to provide affirmatively for a method of procedure, despite the express constitutional requirement. Especially so, since the court declared the
title reference to venue to be mere surplusage.
III. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
FAMILY LAW.

SUCCESSIONS.

MINERAL RIGHTS

Harriet S. Daggett*
A.

FAMILY LAW

Separation-Cruelty
Mudd v. Mudd' is concerned in great detail with testimony
concerning cruel treatment alleged by the wife to have been exhibited by excessive desire on the husband's part. Because the
wife failed to prove "unusual" behavior or force sufficient to
constitute cruel treatment, the judgment for separation granted
by the lower court was annulled and her suit was dismissed.
Cruelty was alleged as ground for separation in Hammonds
v. Caballero 2 and while the "equal wrongs" doctrine was pleaded
in defense, the court found a preponderance of fault to lie at the
husband's door and granted the separation to the wife. Ten
dollars per week alimony was awarded and the question of attorney's fees was remanded as the trial court had failed to pass
upon it and hence the supreme court was not in a position to
do so.
Clark v. Clark3 is concerned with evaluation of salacious
and highly improbable statements of a husband made on reconventional demand for adultery after his wife had filed suit for
separation on the ground of cruelty. His evidence was corroborated only by one of his friends, who represented himself as
being one of the wife's associates in the lurid career painted by
the husband. In regard to this testimony the court said:
"While a corespondent is not disqualified by law from testifying with reference to his intimacies with the erring spouse,
85. 207 La. 194, 211, 20 So. (2d) 917, 922 (1945).
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 206 La. 1055, 20 So. (2d) 311 (1944).
2. 207 La. 1090, 22 So. (2d) 660 (1945).

3. 207 La. 606, 21 19, (2d) 758 (1945).
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the statements made by him must be corroborated and
weighed with great caution before being accepted as true."4
The husband failed to prove his case "by competent evidence
within that reasonable legal certainty required by law," and in
the best interests of all parties the whole matter was dismissed.
However, the husband seemed to have accomplished his purpose
of stifling his wife's attempt to get a separation, as the supreme
court followed the lower court's view that she had failed to establish her charges.
Mrs. Goodwin 5 succeeded in securing a separation for cruel
treatment after nineteen years of successful marriage and the
birth of seven children. The last five years of the marriage indicated a change in the husband and his behavior passed the "supportable" stage by far. Sixty dollars per month alimony was
allowed for the wife and two minor daughters. The wife's attorney fees of $125, a community debt, were assessed to the husband under the general rule.
Divorce
A husband while in Newfoundland sued his wife, who was
in Texas, for divorce under the two year act." A curator ad hoc
was appointed to represent the wife. The defense to the husband's suit was that he had not resided in Louisiana for two
years or more preceding the filing of suit, as he had spent nearly
two years immediately preceding the hearing in Newfoundland
on a government construction contract. The cases of Laplace v.
Briere7 and Trinchard v. Grace8 were discussed and statements
from each quoted. The husband received his decree and the following statement on "continuous residence" was made:
"The plaintiff must be a resident of this state, and such residence must be continuous. As was said in the case of Laplace
v. Briere (No. 25242) [152 La. 235], 92 So. 881, we do not think
this means that he should remain here every moment of that
time; but he must actually reside here, and maintain a place
to which he can and does return when the causes which take
him away on business or pleasure have ended." 9
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

207 La. 606,
Goodwin v.
McWilliams
152 La. 235,
152 La. 942,
McWilliams

613, 21 So. (2d) 758, 760.
Goodwin, 207 La. 690, 21 So. (2d) 875 (1945).
v. McWilliams, 206 La. 1007, 20 So. (2d) 295 (1944).
92 So. 881 (1922).
94 So. 856 (1922).
v. McWilliams, 206 La. 1007, 1011, 20 So. (2d) 295, 296 (1944).
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Two years had been spent separate and apart while the husband
clearly was residing in Louisiana but the court made the statement that "so far as the evidence goes, the plaintiff's residence in
this state, separate and apart from his wife, has continued to this
day."10
A soldier sued his wife in New Orleans for divorce under
the two year act." She pleaded reconciliation; which would
have broken the continuity of the two year period. His testimony was in form of depositions taken before a notary public in
Cook County, Illiriois. Preponderance of evidence there, corroborated by some "in-laws" in New Orleans, convinced the
lower court that there had been no reconciliation. Since this
fact was really the only question at issue, the supreme court
saw no reason upon review of the evidence to question the judgment in the husband's favor. No question of voluntary or involufitary absence appears in the opinion.
Jurisdiction is the question in Burgan v. Burgan,1 2 where a
soldier siid his wife for divorce on the ground of adultery. The
trial court refused to take jurisdiction since the soldier's domicile appeared to be Virginia, from whbnce he came to the army,
and his wife's domicile was his. The supreme court, h6wever,
tobk the position that his matrimoniWl domicile was in Louisiana
which gave jurisdiction; little was said about his or his wife's
dormiicile other than the recitation of the usual well-known rules.
Since this case is noted in a previous issue of this journal,"" further discussion is unnecessary.
Custody of Children
Agaih comes In re Sherrill," a continuation of the contest
over a little girl born to a child of fourteen or fifteen, whose marhiage naturally proved unsuccessful. The supreme court decided in this chapter that the juvenile court of Caddo Parish had
no jurisdiction to decide whether or not the child within its geographical area was a "neglected child" as was alleged in affidavit
by the child's 'paternal grandmother, with whom the little girl
had lived since birth. The majority opinion expressed the view
that the issue was custody only, which must be decided in connection with the parents' proceedings for separation, wherein
10.
11.
12.
13:
14.

206 La. 1007, 1010, 20 So. (2d) 295, 296 (1944).
Barnes v. LeBlani6, 207 L. 989, 22 So. (2d) 404 (1945).
207 La. 1057, 22 So. (2d) 649 (1945).
See Note, supra p. 469.
206 La. 457, 19 So. (2d) 203 (1944).
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the child's mother had already been granted provisional custody.
Judge Hamiter wrote a strong dissent wherein he expressed the
documented opinion that the issue was whether the child was
neglected, a matter over which the juvenile court did have jurisdiction and which should be tried on its merits and without reference to the evidence dealing with custody-a matter between
contesting parents. Technical matters of jurisdiction seem to
becloud the really important question of the child's best interest
and it is a pity that this recurring issue between divorce court
and juvenile court could not be ironed out, for the emotional upheaval accompanying these procedures weakens the child's already disturbed sense of security and tends to produce an unstable individual.
A pitiful story of neglect, malnutrition and general misery
is told in Guidry v. Guidry.15 The court most properly awarded
custody to the maternal grandparents where there was "a united
family, leading humble lives and having no extravagances" but
where the child had affection and was happy. The court pointed
out that there is "no right to a suspensive appeal from a judgment determining who shall have the care and custody of a
child. 111 "The child is always subject to the authority of the
judge having original jurisdiction over the contest" 7 and may
order the child into custody without awaiting an application for
rehearing.
On a writ of habeas corpus in State -ex rel. Divens v. Johnson,1 8 a husband sought to take his child from its mother,
divorced by him for cause of adultery. He had permitted the
mother to support and care for the child for ten years. The
mother pleaded that the matter was pending in the divorce proceeding where modification of the decree as to custody was requested. The supreme court decided that the plea of lis pendens
should be sustained and the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed.
Scacciaferro v. Hymel. 9 is concerned with another sad struggle over the custody of a child of divorced parents. The father
of the child was working, but his mother was willing to care for
the child. The mother of the child was working also and it was
admitted that the child would have to be cared for at times by
her maternal grandmother. The court remarked: "in the last
analysis, the question really is whether the child should be reared
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

206
206
206
207
206

La. 1049, 20 So. (2d) 309 (1944).
La. 1049, 1054, 20 So. (2d) 309, 310.
La. 1049, 1055, 20 So. (2d) 309, 311.
La. 23, 20 So. (2d) 412 (1944).
La. 973, 20 So. (2d) 284 (1944).
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by her own mother or by her paternal grandmother.""0 At times
it has appeared that there was a tendency to award custody of
children of a working mother to the working father, which meant'
that the father's family rather than the mother's family reared
the child, who was cut off from his mother rather completely by
this method. Such a course would have meant a departure from
the established policy of giving custody to the mother, when she
was a fit person, of course, and when other considerations bearing upon the paramount question of best interest of the child
were relatively equal. The decision under discussion giving custody to the mother removes any fears that might have been entertained regarding such a penalty against the mother for following a course of action to her credit in attempting to sustain
herself rather than relying on alimony and thus lessening the
chances of another marriage of the husband's being successful,
a result which is socially undesirable.
A husband sued, in Thompson v. Thompson,21 for a separation on the ground of abandonment, and the wife answered with a
reconventional demand for a divorce on the ground of adultery.
Her demand prevailed. Custody was the only point upon which
the husband had taken appeal and his position was that neither
he nor the mother were fit for the custody but that his parents
instead of hers should have the children. Because of this controversy over the custody of the three children the judge postponed his decision on this point until he should receive a report
of an investigation by the Department of Public Welfare. After
this report was digested he awarded custody to the mother, who
was to care for the children in the home of her parents. The
chief justice complimented the judge in taking the wise precaution of having an investigation by the welfare department and
affirmed the judgment.
Alimony
Miller v. Miller2 raised an interesting point in regard to alimony. In June of 1930, the husband was by rule, after suit of
divorce was filed, granted provisional custody of the minors and
the wife was awarded $150 per month alimony pendente lite.
In March, 1931, judgment of divorce was rendered in favor of
the husband, custody of the minors was awarded him and no
mention of alimony appeared in the judgment. In February,
20. 206 La. 973, 983, 20 So. (2d) 284, 287.
21. 207 La. 992, 22 So. (2d) 405 .(1945).
22. 207 La. 43, 20 So. (2d) 419 (1944).
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1933, the judgment was affirmed, and in March; 1933, a rehearing
was refused. For this period between June, 1930, and March,
1933, accrued alimony, less payments, totalled $1,835.54. In the
present suit the divorced wife sought to collect this amount.
Defendant husband pleaded that the alimony terminated with
the judgment of final divorce in March, 1931, and that he had
paid up to that date. The lower court took the position that the
alimony continued until refusal of rehearing in March, 1933, a
point not definitely passed upon in the higher court. In any
event, three years had elapsed and Article 353823 was applied
and prescription held to have run.
White v. Bendix2 4 maintains the familiar rule that alimony
granted the wife under Article 160 of the Civil Code "may be
adjusted at any time to meet the changing needs of the wife and
the husband's ability to pay. ' 25 An award of forty dollars per

month out of the husband's salary of first $183 per month, later
$193 per month, was not disturbed despite his increased taxes
and expenses, as the wife's health was bad.
B. SuccEssIoNs
Absentees
Plaintiffs in Dugas v. Powell 2 claimed a piece of property
as descendants of brothers and sisters of one Francois Zenon
Boutte who died intestate in 1863 without ascendants or descendants. Defendants claimed through 162 persons, descendants of
an uncle of the deceased. The defendants maintained that they
believed themselves to be the rightful heirs when they were put
into possession by an ex parte judgment in 1936 and insisted that
since the other heirs were unknown they had acquired full
ownership under Article 77 of the Civil Code. The court pointed
out that Articles 78 and 79 limit the wording of Article 77 and
specifically reserve the rights of the absentee until prescription
shall have run. The cases reviewed disclosed no decision wherein descendants of an absentee had been precluded from asserting
such a right as was here involved. Estoppel was pleaded to no
avail as no action had been taken by plaintiffs which affected
their right against the defendants and as delay and inaction
cannot be made the basis of an estoppel. Prescription of thirty
23.
24.
25.
26.

La.
206
206
207

Civil Code of 1870.
La. 741, 20 So. (2d) 10 (1944).
La. 741, 743, 20 So. (2d) 10.
La. 316, 21 So. (2d) 366 (1945).
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years under Article 1030 was pleaded in the alternative under
the doctrine of Bendernagel v. Foret"l and Tillery v. Fuller.8
The court most properly distinguished the case of acceptance by
one presumptive heir and failure to accept by others from a case
of acceptance by heirs more remote in degree. The decision is
probably most equitable as it prevented a manipulator of lost
heirs from profiting and left the rightful owners in possession of
their land rather than with a judgment which would have been
worth little due to the impracticability of its execution. The discussion in regard to Articles 77, 78 and 79 and previous cases
dealing with that segment of the code is disturbing, as in part it
seems to fail to differentiate between estates of absentees left
upon departure and inheritances vesting afterward which if carried too far would vitiate the purpose of the articles.
Donations inter vivos
The question in Congregation of Sisters of St. Joseph v. Glassell20 was whether or not the Congregation of Sisters had a good
title to certain lots of ground in Baton Rouge. The lots had been
received as a gift from a corporation all members of which had
died and hence the entity was no longer in operation. The clause
inthe deed of gift which was questioned was as follows:
"This donation is made and accepted for and in consideration of the Sisters of St. Joseph always maintaining the Asylum and providing for the Orphans of East Baton Rouge, the
said Benevolent Association of the Catholic Ladies being convinced of the impossibility of providing in a suitable and
proper manner for the maintenance and education of the said
Orphans. It being well understood and agreed that in the
event the said Religious of St. Joseph should think proper to
transfer to another locality, in said Town of Baton Rouge, the
said Asylum, they will have the right to do the same; or in
case they should abandon said premises, then such improvements that may have been done by them on said premises
shall be valued by experts equally chosen in both parties and
the evaluation thereof will be reimbursed to the said Sisters
of St. Joseph." 30
The Sisters were building another orphanage in a more suitable
place outside the corporate limits of the city but within the me27.
28.
29.
30.

145
190
207
207

La. 115,
La. 586,
La. 213,
La. 213,

81 So. 869 (1919).
182 So. 683 (1938).
20 So. (2d) 923 (1945).
217, 20 So. (2d) 923, 924 (1945).
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tropolitan area. The court held that the manifest purpose of the
donors would be carried out when this property was sold and
the proceeds used to build another orphanage within the town
of Baton Rouge and hence that the Sisters had a good title and
were authorized to convey it to the defendant.
The Succession of Byrnes31 is concerned with proof regarding
separate property of the second wife of deceased. Her husband
had given her one hundred dollars per month as a personal manual gift and she had saved it and purchased certain stock and a
mortgage. Her testimony was corroborated by documents left
by the deceased and by records of the homestead association.
There was no question of the disposable portion having been exceeded, so the gifts were upheld and her separate ownership of
the property was established. Articles 1539, 1746, 1752 and 2404
together with pertinent decisions were cited as authority.
Creech v. Errington
32 witnesses another property contest between "his" children and "her" children. Just preceding his second marriage the plaintiffs' father and the prospective wife executed an instrument purporting to be a cash sale. No consideration was actually given and it was conceded by defendants to be
a gift, which, however, they maintained was valid. Plaintiffs
maintained that it was null since the donor, plaintiffs' father,
reserved the usufruct to himself, which is forbidden by Article
1533.. The clause of the deed in controversy was as follows:
"That the said Mrs. Bena Lester, purchaser herein, -does hereby constitute and appoint the said James M. Creech, her agent
and attorney in fact, to have and control said property during
his lifetime, collecting and disbursing all income from said
properties as may seem just and right to him. That in the
event of the death of the said James M. Creech before the
death of the said Mrs. Bena Lester, then this provision of this
contract shall cease upon the death of the said James M.
Creech, and she, the said Mrs. Bena Lester, shall at once resume control of said properties with full rights of owner of
the same."33
Defendants urged that this clause created an agency rather than
a usufruct. The court decided that it created a usufruct and
hence was void. The attempt to create a usufruct under the
guise of an agency is said to be an attempt to circumvent the law.
31. 206 La. 1026, 20 So. (2d) 301 (1944).
32. 207 La. 615, 21 So. (2d) 761 (1945).
33. 207 La. 615, 620, 21 So. (2d) 761, 763.
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Donations Mortis Causa
Two interesting points were at issue in the Succession of
Gurganus.' The first contention was that the will was null because "it was predicated upon a contingency which never occurred." This plea was grounded upon the following sentence:
"I Louise G. Gauthier if anything should happen that I would
not return. . .

."35

In deciding that the will was not a conditional

one the court said:
"Undoubtedly the testatrix was thinking of the possibility of
death or she would not have made a will. The will is general
in its nature, and the reason assigned for writing the will is
general in its nature. It does not appear that it was intended
to be operative only during a certain period or until a certain
emergency had passed. The authorities cited by the appellant
involve wills that clearly show that they were intended to be
operative only during a certain period of time or until an
emergency had passed. This is not true in the present case." 80
Furthermore, the will had never been revoked though a long
time had elapsed before death. The will was made before the
second marriage of deceased, and the bequests were made to
brothers and sisters.
The second contention was that the will purported to bequeath only the property owned at the time the will was made
and did not convey subsequent acquisitions. The court decided
that such was her intention and applied Articles 1720 and 1721
of the Civil Code. The cases of DeLaureal v. Roquet's Succes8 and Succession of Marks 9
sion,87 Succession of Burnside,"
were
distinguished. Since particular properties were assigned to her
relatives the court found that the phrase "I want my sisters...
brothers ...

to have what I own"' 0 did not indicate a universal

legacy. None of the properties mentioned were owned at the
time of death but two rings, so the husband inherited everything
else.
Mrs. Levy died leaving an olographic will with a list of bequests. In Succession of LevyO her relatives attacked the will
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

206 La. 1012, 20 So. (2d) 296 (1944).
206 La. 1012, 1014, 20 So. (2d) 296, 297.
206 La. 1012, 1019, 20 So. (2d) 296, 299.
177 La. 815, 149 So. 464 (1933).
35 La. Ann. 708 (1883).
85 La. Ann. 1054 (1883).
206 La. 1012, 1019, 20 So. (2d) 296, 299 (1944).
207 La. 1062, 22 So. (2d) 650 (1945).
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in various ways, some of the approaches having no validity whatever. The real issue was that the bonds she described in the will
and allocated to certain persons could not be found. Hence, her
relatives insisted that the thing bequeathed had perished, as it
were, and the bequest should not be honored. In each item, however, the testatrix had set forth the sum of money which the bond
represented behind an equal sign. The justice, using Article 1715
for guidance, went into all of the circumstances of the case plus
the will as a whole and decided that the intent of the testatrix
was to leave the worth of the bonds rather than the bonds themselves, thus affirming the judgment of the lower court.
Miss Celanire L. Correjolles made the Charity Hospital of
New Orleans her residuary legatee under certain conditions, and
42
the Succession of CorrejolleS
is concerned with determining
whether these conditions had been met. Her bequest amounted
to about $240,000 and she stated in her will that a hospital building "commensurate in importance with the value of the legacies"
should be erected. The hospital administrators offered to build
two pavilions for $60,000. The court properly decided that such
structures were not "commensurate in importance." The plea for
more time to plan was also refused as five years had already
elapsed at the time of the trial, and the will expressly stated that
the buildings should be erected as speedily as possible. There
was crying need for them at the time the funds became available and they could have been properly used in 1937 and readily
tied in with the large building erected with federal funds. Now,
by the administrator's statement, another building was not
needed, nor was there room for it.
The sole question presented in Succession of Locarno"s was
whether or not there had been a tacit revocation of a particular
legacy. The bequest was as follows:
"I want my two houses (including the lots in the back of
each) 1122 and 1120 Saint Philip to be put up for sale, and
out of this sale I give and bequeath Evelyn Penn Puig
$1000.00, Jack Yuille $1000.00, St. Augustin Church $1000.00,
Mandeville Arnoult $300.00 in memory of his numerous kindnesses to me and mine.-The rest of the money from the two
houses I give and bequeath to the Maison Hospitaliere (I mean
the rest of the amount brought from small houses).,,44
42. 206 La. 581, 19 So. (2d) 259 (1944).
43. 206 La 384, 19 So. (2d) 175 (1944).
44. 206 La. 384, 386, 19 So. (2d) 175.
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Before her death the deceased sold part of the realty mentioned
but kept what appeared to have been the proceeds therefrom in
separate envelopes, though she had used part of the amount
shown to have been received from one of the sales. The court
held under Articles 1691 and 1695 that the testators' sale of the
property showed a "change of will" even though it was not the
realty that was bequeathed but the proceeds to be derived therefrom. The funds in the envelope were not absolutely identified. The deceased had been under heavy expense preceding her
death and probably had sold because she needed funds.
Settlement
A contest between the tutor of a minor child and the executor of his mother's will over the executor's final account appears in Succession of Futch.45 Three items were in contest. Two
were declared in favor of the tutor as they appeared to be costs
caused by the negligence in the one case and the intentional dilatoriness in the other of the executor. The third item-insurance
-was the tutor's business under Article 355 of the Code as
amended by Act 170 of 1928, and loss incurred by failure of his
duty should not be charged against the executor.
Plaintiffs in Gaspard v. Coco 46 had sought to have judgment
in a foreclosure proceeding against the succession of their deceased mother set aside and their suit had been dismissed on an
exception of no cause of action. On appeal the case was remanded, since the pleadings were grounded on a fraud, which
if proved would vitiate the foreclosure procedure. Plaintiffs
stated that they had accepted their mother's estate which would
have precluded the use of the curator ad hoc and in rem procedure authorized by Act 44 of 193247 only when the debtors' estate
was not under administration and had not been accepted by heirs.
The holder of a note sued the heirs of the maker in Jordam
v. Smith.48 Having accepted the succession unconditionally, they
were bound for their virile shares. While acknowledgment of a
debt by one joint debtor does not interrupt prescription as to his
co-debtors, the heirs of the one who did acknowledge were bound
under the above stated rule.
One of the assets of the succession being administered by
plaintiff in Succession of Dodson v. Rutledge's Administrator"9
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

207 La. 807, 22 So. (2d) 125 (1945).
208 La. 73, 22 So. (2d) 829 (1945).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5021.1-5021.3.
206 La. 765, 20 So. (2d) 17 (1944).
206 La. 606, 19 So. (2d) 267 (1944).
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was a judgment against Dodson, whose succession was being administered by one of his sons. This suit was against the administrator of the Dodson succession asking that he show cause why
the realty, sole asset of the succession, should not be sold to pay
the judgment. The administrator stated that he needed more
time in order that a pending suit might be settled and a more
favorable time of year for the sale be reached. There was judgment in the lower court directing the administrator to apply for
an order of sale of the property and to have it advertised and
sold. The supreme court affirmed this judgment as the administrator of the Dodson succession showed no legal ground for refusing to have the property sold. The right of the judgment
creditor was unconditional and he could not be forced to an additional delay in asking the debtor's administrator for an accounting or for other reason.
It was held in Wolfson v. Lisso's Succession" on the authority
of Article 2582 of the Civil Code that all the heirs of a vendor
must agree in demanding the rescission of a sale for lesion beyond moiety.
Plaintiff had formed a business and personal association with
one Mrs. Salraggio who had died. Her heirs had been put into
possession of her effects by an ex parte judgment, and the case
of lennusa v. Rosato"1 is concerned with plaintiff's attempt to
set aside this judgment and obtain one-half of the property of
deceased. He failed to prove a partnership as he had no written
evidence and little corroboration for his oral testimony.
Collation
The main question in Doll v. Doll5 2 was whether a judgment

sending the heirs, who had accepted unconditionally, into possession and closing the succession was a bar to a later demand for
collation. After a most careful consideration and a full review
of authorities, the court held that such a judgment was a bar.
After judgment the succession ceased to exist and the heirs became mere co-owners. The language of Articles 1242 and 1290 is
clear that no demand for collation can then be made. In the alternative an error of law was pleaded under the theory that since
all consented to the judgment, it was but a contract among the
heirs. This contention was also disposed of adversely under authority of Article 1826, since the alleged 6rror was not the prin50. 207 La. 67, 20 So. (2d) 427 (1944).
51. 207 La. 999, 22 So. (2d) 467 (1945).
52. 206 La. 550, 19 So. (2d) 249 (1944).
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cipal cause or motive which induced the plaintiffs to obtain the
judgment putting the heirs in possession.
Community Property
A wife contracted to buy a certain lot and pay for it in small
installments. The seller finally foreclosed, seized, advertised for
sale, and bought the property. The husband of buyer, having
built a house upon the lot, intervened in the suit. In Atkins v
Smith" it was decided that the vendor already had title under
her contract to sell and hence added nothing to her right under
the erroneous foreclosure, sale and purchase. Rights of the husband and his heirs to be reimbursed for the improvements made
in good faith were reserved, for, while title to the land gave title
to works constructed thereupon, yet the builder in good faith
was entitled to either cost or enhanced value of the land.
Prescription
The essence of the majority opinion in Veltin v. Haas" is
that swamp lands may be acquired under good faith prescription
of ten years when actual possession has been demonstrated by
the cutting of timber and associated activities. "'The corporeal
possession necessary to support the prescription is governed by
the use for which the land is destined.' " Evidence was carefully analyzed and authority was copiously cited. The concurring opinion of Justice Rogers is grounded on a statement in the
deed by the tax collector that taxes of the disputed year Were
paid, which estopped officials from issuing another valid tax title
whether taxes had actually been paid or not. The chief justice
dissented on the prescription point, feeling that sufficient possession for the purpose had not been proved.
C.

MINERAL RIGHTS

Reversionary Interest
The "so-called" reversionary interest, as the court terms it,
again made its appearance in Gulf Refining Company v. Orr.5"
A land6wner sold one-fourth of the minerals; and while this
servitude was still in effect, she sold the land and "reserved all the
53.
54.
55.
56.

207
207
207
207

La.
La.
La.
La.

560,
650,
650,
915,

21 So. (2d)
21 So. (2d)
675, 21 So.
22 So. (2d)

728
862
(2d)
269

(1945).
(1945).
862, 870.
(1945).
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minerals." After expiration of the original servitude oil was discovered and the vendor and reserver claimed against the present
landowner, her vendee. The court again stated that she could
have reserved the reversionary interest, called a hope, in this connection; but such a reservation must be expressed and not implied; and hence under the phrase "reserved all minerals" she
reserved only the three-fourths which she then owned and did
not reserve the "hope" of the other one-fourth, the realization of
which went to her vendee with the land.
Suspension of Prescriptionof Servitude
Union Sulphur Company v. Campbell 57 was a concursus proceeding to distribute royalties to rightful owners. Aside from
judicial interpretation of a certain contract under which one contestant unsuccessfully claimed and mathematical computations
of the involved fractional interests of numerous persons, the case
deals with the suspension of prescription because of minority of
some of the owners in one chain of title. One group had obtained
a 1/32 mineral interest from a landowner who had previously
sold an undivided five acres in the tract of land. The other group
claimed from a title issuing from the owners of the undivided
five acres. The court decided that, since these interests had different sources, the parties were not co-proprietors and hence
suspension in one line would not affect prescription in the other.
The trial court had held that, prescription having been suspended
by the minority of some of the owners, the major owners would
also benefit because of the indivisibility of the servitude under
the doctrine announced in Sample v. Whitaker"8 and adhered to
in subsequent decisions of the court. Since no appeal had been
taken on this point, it was not a matter for the supreme court's
deliberation. The chief justice remarked:
"The question of correctness of the judgment maintaining
that the prescription of ten years was suspended by the minority of some of the co-owners of the 1/32 mineral interest, or
royalty interest, owned by the transferees of Lexie Verdine,
would be an interesting one if anyone affected adversely by
the judgment had appealed from it; but the question has lost
much of its public importance, or general importance, as an
abstract question of law, by the enactment at the last session of the Legislature, of Act 232 of 1944. ... 2,59
57. 207 La. 514, 21 So. (2d) 626 (1945).
58. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
59. 207 La. 514, 528, 21 So. (2d) 626, 631 (1945).
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Since Act 232 of 1944 has been discussed in previous issues of
this journal,60 space will not be taken here for further comment.
Sale
Treat v. Hunt Oil Companyel is an instance of a sale of a mineral interest by one who knew he did not own it. His conveyance
so informed his vendee. The court declared this defendant not
to be owner, sustained the call in warranty and ordered an accounting. Defendants relied upon Young v. Sartor6 2 which the
court distinguished on the ground that the vendee in that case
of a timber sale was innocent.
Distribution of royalties is the question in Rudman v. Dupuis.63 The main issue was the interpretation of the following
clause in a sale made by the defendant. The conveyance recited
a sale of an "'undivided two-eighths (2/8ths) of the one-eighth
(1/8th) fractional part of the minerals and royalties in, on, or
under' ,164 the land. Plaintiff contended that these words evidenced a sale of 1/32, while defendant maintained that only 2/512
or 2/8 of 1/8 of 1/8 had been sold under this instrument. The
court found that the instrument was ambiguous, as the clause
in question might be read as follows: "two-eighths of the oneeighth fractional part of the minerals and [of the] royalties
[one-eighth]." Evidence dehors the instrument to find the intention of the parties was in order and it was established that
the plaintiff's interpretation was correct.
Privilege
The plaintiff in Bethlehem Supply Company v. Pan-Southern
Petroleum Corporation5 asserted a privilege on property found
on defendants' lease in attempting to recover for materials and
supplies furnished. Defendant moved to dissolve the writ of
provisional seizure on several grounds. The most serious discussion was in regard to the constitutionality of Act 100 of 1940.6
The defendant alleged that the title to the act was missing, that
no enactment clause appeared, and that the title became misleading by repeating the title of Act 145 of 19347 which was amended
60. Daggett and Bennett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944 (1944) 6 LOUSIAxNA
LAW REVIEw 1, 6.
61. 207 La. 539, 21 So. (2d) 721 (1945).
62. 152 La. 1064, 95 So. 223 (1922).
63. 206 La. 1061, 20 So. (2d) 363 (1944).
64. 206 La. 1061, 1063, 20 So. (2d) 363 (1944).
65. 207 La. 149, 20 So. (2d) 737 (1944).
66. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) §§ 5101.1-5101.5.
67. Ibid.
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by Act 100 of 1940; and in all, it did not show that the privilege
was to cover oil produced and stored on the lease. The court
examined the official journal and the calendar of the senate and
found that amendments to the title were proposed and passed.
They found a proper enactment clause and also concluded that
the title was "indicative" of the subject matter, which is sufficient. The courts' stand on this objection is heartening and most
helpful to draftsmen.
Damages
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied in the damage
Mit entitled Watkins v. Gulf Refining Company.,8 The defendant

was unable to sustain his burden of proving that "he did not do
anything that he should not have done, that he left undone nothing he should have done and that he neglected no legal duty owed
'o the plaintiff. '69 The evidence regarding the drilling of the well
and the precautions used and not used to prevent the damaging
"blow out" was most carefully reviewed, and is most interesting,
as is the evidence regarding the fixing of damages. The case will
be considered elsewhere in this symposium, so further discussion
here will not be undertaken.
Conservation
The landowner and lessor in Hood v. Southern Production
Company" sued to annul a lease on one hundred acres of land on
the ground that the lessee had failed to comply with the following provision of the agreement:
"'In the event a well or wells producing oil or gas in paying quantities should be brought in on adjacent land and
draining the leased premises the lessee agrees to drill such
offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under similar circumstances.'"71
After the lease was granted and payments made, the state
conservation department issued an order under Act 157 of 194072
establishing a drilling unit of three hundred and twenty acres in
the field where the leased land was located. Later, another order
increased this unit to six hundred and forty acres in order to con68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

206 La. 942, 20 So. (2d) 273 (1944).
206 La. 942, 948, 20 So. (2d) 273, 275.
206 La. 642, 19 So. (2d) 336 (1944).
206 La. 642, 645, 19 So. (2d) 336, 337.
Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 4741.11-4741.31.
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form to federal regulations. But one well was allowed. The
court decided that the drainage clause was not applicable
"... especially where the well that is said to be draining the
leased premises is on land within the 640 acre drilling unit of
which the leased land forms a part and where the lessee is
forbidden by the orders of the Department of Conservation
and by the Federal Order M-68, issued by the Director of Priorities, Office Production Management, to drill a well on the
leased premises." 8
In answering plaintiff's contention that when a prohibitory
law renders the performance of a contract impossible both parties are discharged, the court said further that:
"There is no obligation to drill an offset well in the circumstances of this case, according to a fair and reasonable interpretation of the contract of lease. If the contract should be
annulled the plaintiff could not drill a well on his 100 acres
of land, because a part of it is in one 640 acre drilling unit, on
which the Lewis well is producing gas in paying quantities,
and the other part of the 100 acres of land is in another 640
acre drilling unit on which a well is producing gas in paying
quantities; and the plaintiff, as owner of the leased premises,
is receiving the same revenue that he would be receiving if
the well in Section 2 were on his 35 acres in that section, and
if the well in Section 3 were on his 65 acres in that drilling
unit. In other words, if the Lewis well were on the plaintiff's
35 acres in Section 2 the production would be prorated among
the owners of the mineral rights in the same proportion in
which the production is now being divided; and if the well in
Section 3 were on the plaintiff's 65 acres the production would
be distributed among all of the owners of the mineral rights
in that drilling unit in the same proportion in which the production is now being distributed."7 4
It was also pointed out that Hood was fully aware of the
fact that the conservation commissioner could and might establish compulsory drilling units, when he granted the lease and
received valuable consideration.
Hardy v. Union Producing Company 5 falls within the principle decided in Hood v. Southern Production Company. The
court said:
73. 206 La. 642, 655, 19 So. (2d) 336, 341 (1944).
74. 206 La. 642, 656, 19 So. (2d) 336, 341.
75. 207 La. 137, 20 So. (2d) 734 (1944).
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"... the clause in the lease requiring defendants to drill a well

on the leased premises within the primary term of five years
is not applicable where a well producing gas in paying quantities has been drilled on land within the drilling unit of which
the leased land forms a part and where the lessee is prohibited by orders of the Department of Conservation from drill'7
ing a well on the leased premises.

In Placid Oil Company v. North Central Texas Oil Company,
Incorporated,77 the Hunt Oil Company, lessee, owning the producer's share of seven-eighths in a certain eighty acre tract in
the Cotton Valley Field, wished to drill the Bodcaw formation
which under the conservation department's ruling required an
eighty acre unit. In order to get a drilling permit and make up
the necessary acreage, it asked for unitization of two forty acre
tracts. The permit and unitization order were granted without
notice to or hearing of the real complainant in this proceeding.
Mr. Parten owned one-thirty-second royalty interest in the forty
acre tract upon which the producing well was actually drilled
and one-sixty-fourth royalty interest in the other forty acre tract
which was unitized to make up the eighty acre drilling unit necessary for a permit to search the deep sand. His position was
that since he had been given no opportunity to be heard, he
should not have to abide by the unitization order and thus permit
others owning a share in the forty acres not drilled to participate
in the distribution of proceeds from production. While he had
been technically harmed by the failure to notify him, actually he
had not suffered. It would be presumed that if he had received
notification he would not have objected, since the drilling permit
could not have been obtained without assembling an eighty acre
unit and it was to his advantage that the additional forty acres
included was one in which he also held an interest. It was impossible at this juncture to undo what had happened and to sustain his position would have been to deprive the owners of interests in the forty acres not drilled of their part. Since no prejudice to Mr. Parten's interest could be shown because of his failure
to receive notice, his position as to his share in the production
was not upheld. The clarity of the reasoning and the justice of
the decision are apparent.
The question posed in Alston v. Southern Production Company7s was stated by the court in the following sentence:
76. 207 La. 137, 148, 20 So. (2d) 734, 737.
77. 206 La. 693, 19 So. (2d) 616 (1944).
78. 207 La. 370, 21 So. (2d) 383 (1945).
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"The question in these cases is whether an order of the
Conservation Department, increasing the size of the drilling
units theretofore prescribed by the department in a given oil
or gas field, can have the effect of superseding pooling agreements made between owners of adjacent lands under authority of the previous order of the commissioner.""'
The answer given by the majority was yes. Justice Fournet entered a vigorous dissent, expressing the view that such power in
the commissioner tends "to create confusion and uncertainty as
to valuable property rights,"80 that the hearing is valueless if the
first order has been lawfully issued after proper investigation and
that
the property rights of small property owners can, to all
effect and purpose, be confiscated or else rendered valueless,
for such a property owner, not being able to maintain at
yearly salaries the geologists and experts at the command of
the state and the large companies, is unable to produce expensive scientists and experts as witnesses at or bear other
expenses incidental to, such hearings indefinitely."8' 1
Proceedings to recover certain sums allegedly due for violation of conservation laws were consolidated upon appeal in McHugh, Commissioner of Conservation v. Placid Oil Company.82
Oil had been produced by the defendants in excess of the allowable amount fixed by orders of the commissioner. Section 17 of
Act 157 of 194083 makes it clear that the sum set to be paid by the
wilful violator is penalty or punishment and not for "restitution,
compensation or indemnification." Prescription of six months
was pleaded under Act 67 of 1926. The plaintiff contended that
his action was civil in form and did not fall within the intendment of this statute, entitled an act "relative to the prescription
of criminal offenses." The majority of the court decided that the
"nature of the cause of action is the test" and determines the applicable prescription and it applied the six months' prescriptive
period. The chief justice dissented in a most logically reasoned
and thoroughly convincing opinion. The presentation of the historical evolution of the statute in question alone would seem to
have sufficed. In addition, the finding of a legislative intent to
79. 207 La, 370, 372, 21 So. (2d) 883, 384.

80. 207 La. 370, 380, 21 So. (2d) 383, 387.
81. Ibid.
82. 208 La. 511, 19 So. (2d) 221 (1944).
83. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 4741.27.
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expect an excerpt to be lifted bodily from its context and its enclosure within the criminal statutes and applied to a civil suit is
indeed unreasonable.
A public policy of permitting hot oil to be run out of the
state with safety so long as it is not discovered and suit instituted
within six months from the illegal act certainly seems dangerous.
The inconsistency of reasoning in interpreting the statutes involved is pointed out. Lastly, that section of the Constitution
(Section 16 of Article XIX) stating that "Prescription shall not
run against the State in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution or expressly by law" was quoted with
the most telling effect and seemed conclusive to the reader that
unless the special conservation statute laying down this penalty
for protection of the most valuable resource of the state contains within itself a prescriptive period most certainly the state
has unlimited time within which to collect the penaly.
OBLIGATIONS.

CONTRACTS.

MANDATE

Robert A. Pascal*

A.

OBLIGATIONS

Potestative Conditions
At least two cases presented instances of what the court
considered potestative conditions. In the discussion below it
should be borne in mind that a potestative condition by definition
is one which eliminates all possible liability on the part of the
person allegedly bound.'
In Martin v. Dutton Motors2 the validity of the following
agreement was in question:
"'[Martin agreed to deliver to Dutton Motors, Inc., seven
used Ford dump trucks] as a deposit on new Ford dump
trucks which were thereafter, to be purchased by petitioner
at his convenience for future delivery, with the understanding that in the event petitioner purchased as many as ten
new Ford dump trucks the amount of said deposit, represented
by the seven used trucks, was to be treated as a credit upon
the new purchase in the sum of $3,000, and with the further
distinct understanding that should petitioner purchase less
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Arts. 2034, 2035, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. 206 La. 154, 19 So. (2d) 32 (1944).
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than ten new trucks the amount of the credit was to be determined by allowing only $300.00 on each of the new units purchased.' '
The court declared the agreement,
".. . null and void because it was contracted on a potestative

condition.... The instrument did not bind him [Martin] to
purchase 10 new Ford dump trucks from defendant, nor did
it bind defendant to sell him such trucks. Neither party was
bound under the terms of that instrument to do anything...."4
If neither party was bound, there was no contract, certainly.
Nor could there have been a contract if one of the parties actually
had assumed no obligation. But it does seem that by a fair construction of the agreement Martin had obligated himself unconditionally to transfer seven certain trucks to Dutton Motors, and
that Dutton Motors in turn had obligated itself to deliver to Martin any number of trucks desired by him, not exceeding ten, and
to allow a credit of $300 against the price of each such truck purchased.
In Jackson v. New Orleans Board of Trade, Limited,, the defendant alleged that Jackson, an attorney at law, had agreed to
allow the defendant's board of directors to determine his fee.
The court found as a fact that no such agreement had been entered into between the parties, but implied that such an agree-

ment would have involved a potestative condition. Recalling that
potestative condition implies absence of obligation,6 it seems that
a more reasonable interpretation of such an agreement would be
that the client had obligated itself to pay a reasonable fee. Certainly such an interpretation would be consistent with Articles
1964 and 1966 of the Civil Code, which provide:
"1964. Equity, usage and law supply such incidents only
[of a contract] as the parties may reasonably be supposed to
have been silent upon from a knowledge that they would be
supplied from one of these sources."
"1966. By the word usage in the preceding articles, is
meant that which is generally practiced in affairs of the same
nature with that which forms the subject of the contract. .. ."
3. 206 La. 154, 156, 19
plaintiff's petition.
4. 206 La. 154, 165, 19
5. 207 La. 571, 21 So.
6. Art. 2035, La. Civil

So. (2d) 32.

The court apparently quoted from the

So. (2d) 32, 35.
(2d) 731 (1945).
Code of 1870.
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It is submitted that no potestative condition was involved in
either case. 7 The briefs submitted in the cases are not available
to the writer, but it is difficult to understand how the court could
have rendered either decision if the cases had been presented
properly.
Solidary Obligations
Converse v. Victor and Prevost, Incorporated," has the extraordinary effect of depriving a judgment obligor in solido,
against whom the judgment is revived, of the right of seeking
contribution from his co-obligors! In a suit to revive a judgment
about to expire, the plaintiff cited only one of several judgment
obligors in solido. After ten years from the date of the original
judgment, the obligors not cited in the revival proceedings sought
to have the judgment cancelled as to them. Article 2097 of the
Civil Code, which provides, "A suit brought against one of the
debtors in solido interrupts prescription as to all," was denied
application on the theory that the article is "found in the section
of the Code dealing with conventional obligations" and does not
apply to judgments. The court then quoted approvingly from
Hammett v. Sprawl" certain language to the effect there is no
reason to compel a party to revive a judgment against all judgment obligors in solido, and rendered a decision, affirmed on rehearing, that the judgment was to be considered revived against
the one obligor cited and prescribed against the others. Unfortunately, the court did not read far enough in the Hammett case,
for immediately after the words quoted by the court 0 we find,
"The appellant also pleads the prescription of ten years
in bar of this action. As we have seen, this judgment was in
solido. Service of citation was made on H. S. and J. R. Bosley
before the ten years had expired. This interrupts the pre7. The last paragraph of Art. 1966, La. Civil Code of 1870 (not quoted in
the text) gives, as an example of the determination of an unspecified incident of a contract in accordance with local usage, the case of fixing thereby
house rent not specified in the contract of lease, thus implying that Arts.
1964 and 1966 are modifications of the strict rules on certainty of price and
methods of fixing same contained in Arts. 2464, 2465, 2671, and 2672 of the
Civil Code.
8. 208 La. 47, 22 So. (2d) 737 (1945).
9. 31 La. Ann. 325 (1879).
10. The language in the Hammett case was in answer to the contention
that a suit to revive a judgment could not be maintained against one judgment obligor in solido except by citing all, and was not in affirmation of the
contention that judgments could not be revived against such obligors not
cited.
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scription as to the co-obligor in solido, William Sprowl, who

has not been cited. C.C." 11
Aside from being an ill-reasoned decision, the case actually
resulted in depriving the cited obligor of his right to be subrogated to the judgment against his co-obligors in solido, as pointed
out by Chief Justice O'Niell, and thus foreclosed any possibility of his obtaining contribution from them. Chief Justice
O'Niell would have reduced the liability of the cited obligor to
his proportionate share of the indebtedness, or, in effect, reasoned
to a division of the obligation or an abandonment of its solidarity,
apparently by analogy from Articles 2100 and 2203 of the Civil
Code. 12 Even this solution, however, would not be in accord
with the general theory of solidary obligations. The court seems
to have lost sight of the fact that there is no fundamental difference in obligations in solido, no matter from what source they
arise; and also of the fact that, although the articles on solidary
obligations are found under the section of the code on conventional obligations, they were put there for convenience and in
conformity with Roman tradition" and are not limited to obligations arising out of contract. Certainly the articles in question
have been applied to obligations arising out of tort-even in the
case of Reid v. Lowden, 4 cited with approval by the courtand it cannot be assumed that the court would refuse to apply
them in cases of solidary obligations arising from provisions of
law alone, such as those of co-executors under Article 1681, commercial partners under Article 2872, or joint principals under
Article 3026 of the Revised Civil Code. 5 Of course, it must be
assumed that the decision was based on the unexpressed premise
that the judgment was the source of the obligation rather than
a confirmation of it, an assumption which can have little in our
law to support it.16 The rules derived from the theory of solidarity and expressed in the Civil Code have at times caused hardship 7 and may bear investigation, but adherence to the written
law would not even be subject to this objection in the instant
11. Id. at 327.

Italics supplied.

12. On division or remission of solidariness see Comment (1940) 2 LouisiANA LAW REVIEW 365.

13. II Colin et Capitant, Cours 11lmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais (18
ed. 1936) §3; VI Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais
(5 ed. 1925) §6.
14. 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939).
15. Cf. II Planiol, Trait6 2l6mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1939) § 738.
16. Art. 1760, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 365, 371.
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case. It is to be hoped that the decision will be repudiated at the
first opportunity.
Enforcement of Obligations-SpecificPerformance
In Reuter v. Reuter's Succession"8 plaintiff sued for specific
performance of descendant's conventional obligation to "transfer
and deliver certain shares of stock."19 The executor of the succession contended that specific performance should not be allowed because, as reported by the court, the plaintiff "had an
adequate remedy at law and waited for several years to determine whether or not the stock increased or decreased in value
before invoking his equitable remedy. 2 0 The court declared it
was "inequitable" for the executor to decline performance inasmuch as the deceased "had the benefits of the full consideration
given ... for the stock during these several years."12 1 In spite of
this language, however, the court in effect allowed only damages,
for its decree was for "specific performance . . . and in default
thereof, damages. '2 2 As the case involved an obligation "to do,"
it seems that the court, once having found damages inadequate,
should have decreed specific performance and, in default thereof,
distraint of the succession's assets until such obligation had been
2
complied with.
18. 206 La. 474, 19 So. (2d) 209 (1944).
19. Art. 1926, La. Civil Code of 1870. "On the breach of any obligation to
do, or not to do, the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which

permit it, to a specific performance of the contract, at his option, or he may

require the dissolution of the contract, and in all these cases damages may

be given where they have accrued, according to the rules established in the
following section."
20. 206 La. 474, 508, 19 So. (2d) 209, 220.
21. 206 La. 474, 510, 19 So. (2d) 209, 220.
22. Ibid.
23. Art. 1927, La. Civil Code of 1870. "In

ordinary cases, the breach of

such a contract [to do] entitles the party aggrieved only to damages, but

where this would be an inadequate compensation, and the party has the

power of performing the contract, he may be constrained to a specific performance by means prescribed in the laws which regulate the practice of

the courts."
Art. 636, La. Code of Practice of 1870. "When the judgment orders, not
the delivery, but the doing or refraining from something specified in it, if
the party condemned, on demand made by the sheriff that he shall comply

with it, refuses or neglects to do so, and this refusal or neglect appears by
a certificate of the sheriff, the party in whose favor the judgment was ren-

dered may obtain, on motion, an order to distrain all the property movable

and Immovable of the party who is in default, until he shall have fully satisfied the judgment." The article does not apply to cases in which the offi-

cers of the court can locate and seize corporeals and transfer them to the
judgment creditor, but applies to cases in which the debtor is obliged to do
more than physically deliver an object, for example, as in this case, sign
transfers of stock certificates and the like.
of 1870.

See Art. 1906, La,. Civil Code
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Perhaps this failure to adhere to the prescribed method of
enforcing obligations to do was attributable to the error of the
plaintiff, who seems to have demanded specific performance or,
"in the event of failure to do so," damages.24 It might be well
to note, however, that both argument of counsel and reasoning
of the court seem to have been based more on Anglo-American
equity principles than on the specific provisions on the subject
in the Civil Code and the Code of Practice. 25 This is hardly good
technique in a "civil law state."
Release from Debt-Necessity of "Consideration"
The facts in Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble and Granite Com2
0 as viewed by the court, presented the issue
pany, Incorporated,
been
a release from debt. The court disposed
there
had
whether
of it with the words, "In any event, there was no consideration
shown for such a release. '27 The language used indicates possible
confusion of the notions cause and consideration, or at least a
belief that a release of debt requires a quid pro quo. 2 8 This is
error.
Release from debt is essentially gratuitous. Otherwise, the
transaction is of necessity either a compromise, a novation, or
an onerous donation. Besides, unless the release from debt is
24. 206 La. 474, 479, 19 So. (2d) 209, 210.
25. 206 La. 474, 508-510, 19 So. (2d) 209, 220.
26. 207 La. 769, 22 So. (2d) 59 (1945).
27. 207 La. 769, 778, 22 So. (2d) 59, 62.
28. An exchange of values, whether of property or obligations, is the
essence of consideration. Such an exchange is essential to a certain type
of contract in Louisiana law, that is, the synallagmatic or bilateral contract
(Art. 1765, La. Civil Code of 1870, for example, sale, lease, compromise.
Insofar as such contracts are said to be invalid for lack of cause if one
party has not assumed or accepted an obligation toward (or conferred a
right on) the other, cause and consideration approach each other. But
the similarity ends there, for cause must exist in contracts which of their
nature do not require exchange of values, for example, loan, deposit, pledge.
In such contracts, the cause of the principal obligation is the delivery of the
thing lent, deposited, or pledged. Cause might be understood better if it
were defined as legal basis. Thus the legal basis of the contract of sale is
the exchange of values; that of the contract of pledge, the delivery of the
pledge to the pledgee. Certainly everything which may be called cause is
also a legal requirement from another point of view. This theory makes it
possible to explain cause as an over-all requirement that every obligation
have a legal basis and permits us to put cause on a single plane, whether
the obligation be said to arise from status (parent-child), non-contractual
activity (tort, quasi-contract), or contractual activity. Of course, in this
light cause becomes superfluous and useless, but it is just that, for whenever lack of cause is alleged, there is also lack of some legal reason for
recognition of the obligation. Cf. II Planiol, op. cit. supra note 15, at 10371041. Cf. also the German Civil Code which contains no mention of cause,
but includes the now well-known unjustified enrichment Article 812: "Whoever ... without legal reason [ohne rechtlichen grund] obtains something at
the cost of another is obligated to him for restitution . . ."
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considered gratuitous, Article 2201 of the Civil Code can have
no meaning. This article provides, "The release or remission
of debt is presumed always to have been accepted." A presumption of acceptance is not consistent with the idea of payment for
release. If payment has been made, no presumption is necessary; and if no payment has been made, it certainly is not to
be presumed that the debtor has obligated himself to pay for
29
his release.
Fortunately, no injustice resulted in the case, for the release,
if any, was invalid for another reason. Doll, a real estate broker,
at the request of the defendant negotiated with the owner of
certain property as to the terms of a lease desired thereon by the
defendant. After Doll had rendered his services, he advised the
counsel for the defendant in the latter's presence that the ownerlessor would pay his fee. The evidence indicated that neither
Doll nor the defendant had expected the services to be rendered
gratuitously, but both had assumed from the beginning that the
owner would or was legally obligated to pay Doll's fee. Under
the facts, therefore, there would have been sufficient reason to
consider the release invalid because of a vice in Doll's consent,
either error in motive (belief owner-lessor would pay fee) 30
or error in law (belief owner-lessor obligated to pay fee) 1
B.

CONTRACTS

Offer and Acceptance
Waldhauser v. Adams Hats, Incorporated,32 under facts as
found by the court and not here disputed, presented only an offer
and acceptance problem. The offeror-lessor made an offer of a
written lease on certain property. The offeree-lessee requested
an overnight delay before being required to answer and was
granted such time. Not receiving an answer in eleven days or
more, the offeror proceeded to lease the property to a third party.
About five days after this, or about sixteen days after the offer,
the offeree gave notice of his acceptance. Immediately the offeror notified the offeree of his having leased the premises to another. The court upheld the action of the offeror.
29. Cf. II Planiol, op. cit. supra note 15, at §§605, 606. The remission of
debt is treated as a donation in France, except as to requirements of form,
and is subject to collation in the succession of the deceased and reduction
if it

infringes on the legitime.

Id. at §619.

30. Arts. 1824-1827, La. Civil Code of 1870.
31. Art. 1846, La. Civil Code of 1870.

32. 207 La. 56, 20 So. (2d) 423 (1944).
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Although the court did not cite the articles in the Civil Code
governing offer and acceptance, the decision of the court is entirely in accord with those articles as interpreted by the writer
33
in a former issue of this REVIEW.
Revocatory Action
Gast v. Gast 34 distinguished the application of Articles 1987

and 1994 of the Civil Code, which provide, different periods of
prescription for the revocatory action.35 The court's solution was
in complete accord with the language of the texts: if the only
fraudulent feature of the agreement complained of is that the insolvent debtor and a contracting creditor with knowledge of the
debtor's insolvency sought to afford that creditor a preference
over other creditors as to the debtor's assets, then the action prescribes one year after the conclusion of the fraudulent agreement;
if, on the other hand, the agreement is fraudulent for other reasons, for instance, an attempt to defeat the rights of all creditors,
the action prescribes in one year from the date of the complaining creditor's judgment against the debtor. In the instant case the
debtor had given a mortgage to the creditor thus preferred for
money lent over a period of years and stated to amount to $2000
principal and $750 interest. The court was of the opinion that
the amQunt had been considerably exaggerated and, therefore,
that the mortgage amounted to more than an attempt to give
preference to one creditor over the other.
Interpretationof Written Acts
Although Article 2276 of the Civil Code prohibits the use of
parol evidence to vary the terms of written acts, 86 there is noth33. Arts. 1800-1804, 1809, La. Civil Code of 1870, as Interpreted in Comment

(1938) 1
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34. 206 La. 285, 19 So. (2d) 138 (1944).

35. Art. 1987, La. Civil Code of 1870. "No contract made between the
debtor and one of his creditors for the purpose of securing a just debt, shall
be set aside under this section, although the debtor were insolvent to the
knowledge of the creditor with whom he contracted, and although the other
creditors are injured thereby, if such contract were made more than one year
before bringing the suit to avoid it, and if it contain no other cause of nullity than the preference given to one creditor over another."

Art. 1994, La. Civil Code of 1870. "The action given by this section, is
limited to one year; if brought by a creditor individually, to be counted from
the time he has obtained judgment against the debtor; if brought by syndics
or other representatives of the creditors collectively, to be counted from the
day of their appointment."

36. Subsequent verbal agreements modifying written acts may be proven,
however, if the first act was one which need not have been reduced to writing. Salley v. Louvitre, 183 La. 92, 162 So. 811 (1935).
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ing in the Civil Code which has been interpreted to prevent the
use of such evidence in order to explain ambiguities. In fact,
Article 1950 provides, "When there is anything doubtful in
agreements, we must endeavor to ascertain what was the common intention of the parties, rather than to adhere to the literal
sense of the terms," and Article 1956 allows resort to the manner in which both parties have executed the agreement, in order
to arrive at their understanding of it, if the meaning thereof is
not clear from the instrument itself.
Of three recent cases involving discussions of this matter,
the first two-Reuter v. Reuter's Succession3 7 and Rudman v.
Dupuise8-- certainly involved written acts ambiguous in themselves and parol properly was admitted to interpret them. The
Reuter case, in addition, provides an excellent example of internal analysis of an instrument. In the third case, however,
L. P. Davis Construction Company v. Board of Commissioners
for Plaquemines Parish East Bank Levee District,9 a levee
construction agreement, apparently clear and unambiguous as
written, was varied as to mode of payment thereunder by (1)
the introduction of parol evidence to show a different understanding between the parties prior to signing the act and (2) partial performance, after signing the act, in accordance with
that prior understanding. The introduction of evidence of the
prior understanding, it is submitted, was directly contrary to
Article 2276; for under it "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on
what may have been said before, or at the time of making them,
or since." As once remarked by Chief Justice O'Niell, who took
no part in this case, "signatures are not ornaments." Furthermore, the resort to the method of performance by both parties,
under Article 1956, in order to show the construction placed upon
the agreement by them, is not proper unless from the written
act the intent of the parties is doubtful. The court prefaced its
application of Article 1956 by saying the agreement was ambiguous, but it seems there could have been no ambiguity without
reference to matters outside the written act.
C.

MANDATE

The bar of Louisiana has long confused mandate40 with the
sum total of relationships which may exist between various so37.
38.
39.
40.

206 La. 474, 19 So. (2d) 209 (1944).
206 La. 1061, 20 So. (2d) 363 (1944).
207 La. 590, 21 So. (2d) 753 (1945).
Arts. 2985-3034, La. Civil Code of 1870.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. vI

called "agents" and their principals, with the result that Article
2991 of the Civil Code, declaring a mandate gratuitous in the
absence of agreement to the contrary, 1 often has been pleaded
in attempts to bar recovery for services rendered.
Mandate in our law is no more than authority to act juridically for another." This authority may be coupled with another
contractual relationship such as employer-employee, or it may
exist independent of any other contractual relation.4 3 The authority to bind another, the characteristic of mandate, must be
distinguished from the power to bring about legal liability, as in
tort, for "the object of the mandate must be lawful" and the authority conferred must be such as "the principal himself has a
right to exercise."" Thus a domestic servant might enjoy that
status under the contract of lease of services" independently of
the question whether she is given a mandate or authority to purchase household provisions and, in any event, can bring about
legal liability of her employer for her torts by reason of our Civil
0
Code articles on vicarious liability.'
The same distinction between mandate and lease of services
appears in the broker-principal and attorney-client relationships.
A real estate broker may be hired only to bring parties together
or promote a transaction. He may or may not be given authority
to bind or contract for his so-called principal. An attorney may
be employed to give counsel or advice only and not to represent
his client in suit or compromise. Each may enjoy the status of
employee with or without having authority to perform juridical
acts for the persons hiring them. There should be no question,
therefore, as to payment of such persons for services rendered
otherwise than as mandataries, or even as mandataries if otherwise employed by the principal. Yet the contention is often made
that Article 2991 presumes their services to be gratuitous, and so
general is the confusion on this point that the article often is
pleaded even where no mandate at all exists. Thus in Doll v.
Albert Weiblen Marble and Granite Company, Incorporated,"
the defendant contended that Doll, a real estate broker, should
not recover a fee for services, rendered at the former's request,
41. Art. 2991, La. Civil Code of 1870.
42. Arts. 2985, 2995-2997, La. Civil Code of 1870.

note 15, at §2231.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

II Planiol, op. cit. supra

Cf. II Planol, op. cit. supra note 15, at §2232.
Art. 2987, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Arts. 2746-2750, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Arts. 2317-2322, esp. 2320, La. Civil Code of 1870.
207 La. 769, 22 So. (2d) 59 (1945).
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consisting of negotiating terms of a lease with the owner of the
property. The court of appeal had actually denied Doll recovery
on this basis.48 The supreme court reversed the decision, saying,
"We do not think this case presents factual issues controlled by Article 2991 of the Revised Civil Code, but, rather,
that it is governed by the jurisprudence of the courts of this
state to the effect that where one employs the services of another without specifying what compensation will be paid
therefor, or where one avails himself of the services of another
in the performance of a task, he is bound to compensate the
person so employed, or who performs such a service. [cases
omitted] This jurisprudence is founded on the moral maxim
of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the expense
'49
of another. Article 1965 of the Revised Civil Code.
It is unfortunate that the court did not indicate more forcefully
that Doll had served as an employee of the Albert Weiblen Company rather than as its mandatary.
Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Company v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Board5 presented the issue whether a contract
entered into by one party for the benefit of a second without his
authorization should be given full effect. The particular case
involved a purchase of goods on behalf of a public body, as to
which, it is suggested elsewhere in this symposium, the ordinary
rules applicable to individual and non-public juridical entities
may be superseded by considerations applicable to public bodies
alone.5 1 This discussion will be restricted, therefore, to cases
not involving public bodies.
The court reasoned that by doing acts equivalent to the exercise of the right of ownership over the goods, the second party
had "ratified" the acts of the first. This decision is clearly in conflict with Article 3021 of the Civil Code,5 2 not cited in the opinion,
which restricts the obligations of a principal to such as were
contracted by the mandatary "conformably to the power confided
to him" or expressly ratified by the principal. Thus under the
contract of mandate, there is no room to hold one obligated for
48. 17 So. (2d) 313 (La. App. 1944).
49. 207 La. 769, 773-774, 22 So. (2d) 59, 60 (1945).
50. 207 La. 52, 20 So. (2d) 422 (1944).
51. Supra p. 547.
52. Art. 3021, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The principal is bound to execute
the engagements contracted by the attorney, conformably to the power confided to him. For anything further he is not bound, except in so far as he
has expressly ratified It."
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unauthorized acts of his mandatary not expressly ratified. Complementing the provisions under mandate, however, are the articles under the quasi-contract of "management of another's affairs"
(or "quasi-mandate" as it could be called more appropriately)
and particularly Article 2300, under which "equity" is said to
oblige the party "whose business has been well managed" to
comply with the obligations contracted by the unauthorized
3
5

mandatary.

It is suggested that the articles on "quasi-mandate" could be
used to give effect to contracts concluded by unauthorized mandataries,5 ' thereby avoiding decisions based on reasons directly
opposed to the written law.
SALES

Paul M. Hebert*
Rescission for lesion beyond moiety-Necessity of joinder of all
heirs of deceased vendor in action
In Wolfson v. Lisso's Succession' three of the heirs of a deceased vendor brought action to rescind a sale of immovable
property for lesion beyond moiety. The other two coheirs, after
the case had been remanded by the court of appeal for that purpose, were made parties to the suit. The two absent heirs accepted
service of the petition and waived citation in Manila, Philippine
Islands, but the two absent coheirs did not assent to or agree
with the other coheirs on the redemption of the whole property.
The three plaintiffs in their suit offered to return the entire purchase price and consequently sought to effect redemption of the
whole rather than their respective interests. There was thus
presented the question of whether or not all of the heirs of a deceased vendor must affirmatively join in the demand for rescission of a sale for lesion. Stated differently the legal question was
whether one or more of the heirs had the right, without showing
53. Art. 2300, La. Civil Code of 1870: "All persons, such even as are incapable of consent, may, by the quasi contract, resulting from the act of a
third person, become either the object or the subject of an obligation; because the use of reason, although necessary on the part of the person whose
act forms the quasi contract, is not requisite in those by whom, or in whose
favor, the obligations resulting from the act, are contracted."
54. This technique has been used extensively in France (see II Planiol,
op. cit. supra note 15, at §§2273, 2274).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 207 La. 67, 20 So. (2d) 427 (1944).
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affirmatively the consent of all coheirs, to maintain the action for
rescission in behalf of all the heirs by offering to restore the entire purchase price. 2 The court held that Article 2582 entitled the
vendee to require all heirs of the deceased covendor to join in the
action for rescission; that there is no authority for the exercise
of the action by a covendor or coheir without the consent or
permission of other covendors or coheirs; that unlike the early
French view and despite contrary views of some of the French
commentators, the share or portion of one coheir will not be considered as accruing to the other coheirs because of positive provisions of Articles 2580, 2581, and 2582 of the Louisiana Civil
Code. The court further refused to dismiss the petition as of nonsuit to permit additional efforts to obtain the agreement of the
other heirs and entered judgment decreeing the property not
subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.
Article 2582 contains compelling language justifying the in3
terpretation which was placed thereon by the court in this case..
The reason behind the rule which permits the vendee to require
all of the covendors and coheirs to agree in the action for rescission is that the purchaser should not be compelled against his
will to own property in indivision with others when he has purchased expecting to hold the entire property.4 Moreover, as sug2. Rescission for lesion beyond moiety is authorized by Article 2589,
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Art. 2600 provides: "The provisions contained

in the preceding section relative to the case where several coproprietors have
sold a thing, either jointly or separately, and to that where the vendor, or
the buyer, has left several heirs, must likewise be applied to the exercise of
the action of rescission for lesion beyond moiety." This article in effect applies Arts. 2580 through 2584, dealing with sale with right of redemption to
rescission for lesion beyond moiety. The articles are literal translations of
Articles 1668-1672, French Civil Code.
3. Art. 2582, La. Civil Code of 1870: "But in the cases provided for in
the two preceding articles, the purchaser may require, if he deem it proper,

that all the covendors and coheirs may be made parties to the suit, for the
purpose that they may agree together on the redemption of the whole estate;
and In case the covendors or coheirs should not agree, the purchaser shall

be hence dismissed."
4. XIX Baudry-Lacantinerie and Saignat, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique
de Droit Civil (1908) Nos 659-664 discusses the subject under corresponding
articles of the French Civil Code. It is pointed out: the action for rescission
is divisible from which it follows that each vendor or each heir of a vendor
has an action only for his part, French Civil Code, Articles 1217, 1668, 1669

(corresponding to Arts. 2108, 2580, 2581, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870). If each
covendor or coheir of a vendor can exercise the right of redemption only
for his part, the purchaser has the right to exact that it be exercised for
the whole estate when the purchaser has purchased by a single contract and
for a single price and to resist a partial exercise of the right of redemption.
The purchaser has bought the estate to possess it in its entirety and when

one of the covendors or an heir of the vendor acts to redeem the property
against him he has the right to exact that the coheirs agree among themselves for the redemption of the whole estate, French Civil Code, Art. 1670

(corresponding to Art. 2582, La. Civil Code of 1870).

This does not mean
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gested by Justice Higgins, some of the coheirs or covendors
may not desire to join in the action for a variety of motives. The
opposing argument is that the purchaser should only be permitted to require a single action against him and if the parties
plaintiff offer to redeem the whole, the redemption should be permitted. 5 The issue involved has caused difference of opinion
among the French commentators based upon articles which are
literally the counterparts of the articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code. In the discussions on the framing of the Code Napoleon
it was proposed that the projet of the code be amended to permit
one of the coheirs to exercise the right of redemption in the name
of all of the coheirs. But this suggestion was rejected by the
Tribunat.7 Therefore, despite the fact that the present interpretation of Article 2582 is to give a veto power to a minority of the
coheirs or the covendors or to even a single coheir or covendor,
that the action is indivisible. If it were indivisible one of the heirs of the
vendor could exercise the redemption for all. The two articles preceding
Article 1670, French Civil Code, have formally declared that each vendor
can only exercise the right of redemption for his part and Article 1670 specifically authorizes the vendee to resist not only by requiring the redemption to be exercised for all, but also by entitling the purchaser to say to the
vendors "reach an agreement with your covendors in order that they exercise the right of redemption with you; you have the right of exercising the
action only for a part, and I do not desire to submit to it; if your covendors
do not join, the redemption is not to be exercised and I will be, as the article
says, dismissed from the demand." The covendor who acts alone cannot
offer to exercise the redemption for all as he has an action only for a part.
The right to require consent of all of the covendors or coheirs is a faculty
accorded to the purchaser who is free to permit the partial redemption.
By assignment or by mandate the coheirs may authorize one party to bring
the action for the rescission of the whole. But where there is no assignment of the right of the covendors or coheirs and there is no such authorization to act for them, if the coheirs are absent, the one who acts, having
then only his partial action, cannot exercise the redemption for all, and the
buyer, who is not required to submit to a partial redemption can have the
demand dismissed. If there is a renunciation by some of the coheirs which
is done under circumstances which mean that they will not bring the action
at a future date then it is treated as a renunciation in favor of the other
coheirs and there is the right to bring the action for rescission. But if
there is a refusal or failure to act the same result does not follow as they
may bring the action at a later date. In order for the buyer to have the faculty of refusing to submit to a partial redemption, it is necessary that the
sale shall have been made to him by a single contract for a single price.
If there had been separate sales or a sale in the same instrument stipulating
for distinct prices each covendor can exercise the redemption separately for
the part which he has sold, without the purchaser having the power to exact
a total redemption. Art. 1671, French Civil Code (corresponding to Art. 2583,
La. Civil Code of 1870). See 11 Beudant, Cours De Droit Civil Frangais
(1938) No 341; 10 Planiol, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Franqais (1932)
No 195; 2 Josserand, Cours De Droit Civil Positif Frangais (1933) NO 1160.
5. 6 Marcad6, Explication du Code Civil (1875) 318.
6. 14 Fenet, Recueil Complet des TravaUk Pr~paratoires du Code Civil
(1836) 33. Cambac&r~s proposed to amend the projet to provide that each
coheir could only exercise the right of rescission in the name of all coheirs.
7. 3 Maleville, Analyse Ralsonn6e de la Discussion du Code Civil au
Conseil D' Etat (1805) 411-412.
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the view expressed by the court appears to be a sound interpretation of the codal provisions. However, in one respect it appears
that the court seriously erred. In refusing to dismiss the case as
of nonsuit and declaring the sale not subject to rescission for
lesion beyond moiety, the court denied the absent coheirs any
right to assert the rescission at a future time. As they had been
made parties to the action and were before the court the decision
would be res judicataA Under the exceptional circumstances of
this case, in the absence of affirmative showing that the absent
coheirs did not desire to join in the action, it would have been
far preferable to dismiss the action of the plaintiffs as of nonsuit
in justice to the possible interests of the absentees."
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
A.

TORTS

Standards of Care
The Louisiana Supreme Court was recently urged to impose
liability without regard to fault upon an oil driller whose well
blew during the course of the drilling operation." The result of
this calamity was the destruction of a large part of the plaintiff's
rice crop which was being cultivated on a six hundred acre tract
nearby. The plaintiff sought to fasten strict liability on the defendant under the doctrine of "sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas' ' 2 and under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,3 which had
been applied in an identical situation by the Supreme Court of
California several years before;4 although that court, like the
court of Louisiana, had rejected the same doctrine with reference
to other so-called ultrahazardous activities.
The supreme court managed to avoid the choice of doctrine
by finding that the defendant was liable under ordinary prin8. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. The circumstances suggest that the absentees by accepting service
may have intended to acquiesce in plaintiffs' demand.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. (2d) 273 (1944).
2. Art. 667, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1878). Bohlen, The
Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 298.
4. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). See
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation (1932)
5 So. Calif. L. Rev. 263.

